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“PLAUSIBLE CAUSE”?: HOW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CAN ILLUMINATE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S NEW 
GENERAL PLEADING STANDARD IN CIVIL SUITS 
Jesse Jenike-Godshalk* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court decided Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,1 a case concerning the heightened pleading 
standard for civil actions brought under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).2  In this case, Justice Stevens wrote a 
brief dissent in which he argued that the Court should have interpreted 
the heightened pleading standard as equivalent to probable cause.3  He 
analogized the privacy interests of a citizen, who is suspected of 
criminal activity, and the interests of a civil defendant in resisting 
discovery.4  Justice Stevens also thought that the familiar standard of 
probable cause would be easier for judges to apply than the new 
standard that the majority had crafted.5 
Following Tellabs, scholars paid little attention to Justice Stevens’s 
dissent.6  His opinion was overshadowed by two subsequent Supreme 
 *   Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank the following professors for reading this Comment and for providing valuable feedback: 
Michael E. Solimine, Darrell A.H. Miller, and Mark A. Godsey.  The author would also like to thank his 
family, including his in-laws.  Particuarly, he would like to thank his wife, Katie Thoman-Godshalk, for 
her love and support, and his sisters-in-law, Lizzie and Chelle, for helping him take his mind off of law 
school. 
 1. 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 2. The PSLRA imposes, by statute, a pleading standard that is higher than the general civil 
pleading standard embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and different than the heightened civil 
pleading standard embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  In re 2007 Novastar Fin. Inc., Sec. 
Litig., 579 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The PSLRA goes beyond the ordinary pleading requirements 
described in Rules 8(a)(2) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”).  Compare 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(b)(1), (2) (2006), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8, and FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  The PSLRA “requires 
plaintiffs to state with particularity both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts 
evidencing scienter.”  Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 313.  With regard to scienter, “plaintiffs must ‘state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind.’”  Id. at 314 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)). 
 3. Id. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 335–36. 
 6. The author could find only a single casenote that treated Justice Stevens’s dissent at any 
length: John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 679–81 (2008) (arguing, over only four short paragraphs, that Justice Stevens was 
1
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Court decisions that revolutionized7 the general civil pleading standard: 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly8 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.9  Scholars have 
written extensively on these cases, approaching the cases in a variety of 
ways.10  Despite the breadth of secondary literature, most scholars 
right in Tellabs). 
 7. But see Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2010) 
(“This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Iqbal and Twombly run roughshod over a half-
century’s worth of accumulated wisdom on pleading standards.”). 
 8. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 9. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 10. Some scholars have criticized these two cases.  See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing, inter alia, that the new civil 
pleading standard unfairly curtails access to the courts for certain plaintiffs or those with certain claims); 
Jason Bartlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven and Self-Defeating Effects of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73 (2009) (arguing that Twombly cannot achieve its 
purpose of curbing discovery abuse because the Supreme Court’s decision is too confusing); Damon 
Amyx, Note, The Toll of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: An Argument for Taking the Edge off the 
Advantage Given Defendants, 33 VT. L. REV. 323 (2008) (generally criticizing Twombly because it 
favors defendants).  Other scholars have examined the constitutional conflicts created by Twombly and 
Iqbal.  See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death (Finally) of the “Historical Test” for 
Interpreting the Seventh Amendment?, 88 NEB. L. REV. 467 (2010) [hereinafter Klein, Seventh 
Amendment] (predicting that, because of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court will have to abandon part 
of its existing Seventh Amendment jurisprudence); Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 
Pleading Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261 (2009) [hereinafter Klein, Rule 
8] (arguing that, after Iqbal, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 often violates the Seventh Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 1851 (2008) (arguing that the pleading standard enunciated in Twombly violates the Seventh 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).  Yet, some have defended these cases on grounds of efficiency or 
fairness.  See Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063 (2009) (concluding 
that Twombly is a justifiable, even desirable, limit on discovery). 
  Scholars have analyzed Twombly and Iqbal generally.  See, e.g., Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, 
Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505 (2009) (analyzing the “plausibility” standard that 
Twombly and Iqbal established, and arguing that this standard should be regarded as rather minimal); 
John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest Retreat from Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
1 (2009) (discussing generally the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on notice pleading and on motions to 
dismiss).  Scholars have also analyzed these cases within the context of a variety of discrete substantive 
fields.  See, e.g., Kenneth R. O’Rourke, et al., Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Sleeper 2009 Supreme Court 
Decision for Patent Litigators?, 21 No. 12 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6 (2009) (arguing that Iqbal 
creates tension with the specific pleading standard that the Federal Circuit has established for patent 
cases); Erika L. Amarante, New Pleading Standards in Federal Court: Will They Impact Franchise 
Cases?, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 81 (2009) (analyzing franchise cases); William H. Page, Twombly and 
Communication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted Action Under the New Pleading Standards, 5 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 439 (2009) (analyzing antitrust cases); Benjamin W. Cheesbro, Note, A 
Pirate’s Treasure?: Heightened Pleading Standards for Copyright Infringement After Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 241 (2009) (analyzing copyright infringement cases); Robert 
A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 (examining the effect of Twombly on motions to dismiss in 
employment discrimination cases and suggesting a new pleading framework for such cases).  Still others 
have focused on particular facets of the framework that Twombly and Iqbal established.  See, e.g., 
Steinman, supra note 7 (focusing on the first step of the framework, which asks if any of the allegations 
in the complaint are conclusory); Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 U. MO.-KAN. CITY L. 
2
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struggle, to some degree, with the same issues: What do Twombly and 
Iqbal mean?  What do they require lower courts to do?  What pleading 
standard do they create?  What pleading standard should courts adopt for 
civil cases? 
These questions continue to defy simple or certain answers.  
Moreover, scholars have not exhausted the possible ways to approach 
these questions.  Specifically, no one has looked to Justice Stevens’s 
Tellabs dissent in order to address these issues.  No one has looked to 
criminal procedure to determine what Twombly and Iqbal might mean or 
to determine what the general civil pleading standard ought to be.11  
This Comment does just t
As this Comment shows, in Twombly and Iqbal the Supreme Court 
adopted a standard of pleading that shares many similarities with 
probable cause.  In particular, the new civil pleading standard is a form 
of “comparative plausibility” that appears to be, in practice, tantamount 
to a standard of more-likely-than-not probability—the same quantum of 
proof required by probable cause.  Since the new civil pleading standard 
is similar to probable cause, courts may be able to look to probable 
cause jurisprudence to better understand Twombly and Iqbal, especially 
the language in Iqbal that calls on courts to use their “experience and 
common sense.”  At the same time, probable cause jurisprudence 
REV. 999 (2010) (focusing on the role of empathy in the framework that Twombly and Iqbal 
established). 
  Some have analyzed how Twombly and Iqbal affect the federal courts.  See, e.g., Anthony 
Martinez, Note, Plausibility Among the Circuits: An Empirical Survey of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REV. 763 (2009).  Others have analyzed the effects on state courts.  See, e.g., J. 
Thomas Richie & Anna Manasco Dionne, Twombly and Iqbal: The Effect of the “Plausibility” 
Pleading Standard on Alabama Litigators, 71 ALA. LAW. 75 (2010) (noting that, for now, Alabama state 
courts have not followed Twombly and Iqbal, meaning that Alabama has one pleading standard for 
federal courts and another for state courts); Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, 
Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2008) (discussing whether 
the states should adopt the new civil pleading standard enunciated in Twombly and Iqbal). 
  Finally, some scholars have sought to better understand Twombly and Iqbal by examining 
areas of civil procedure other than pleading.  See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical 
Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that 
Twombly grows out of an application to discovery of the Matthews v. Eldridge due process test, which 
governs what process a person is due under any given circumstances); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the 
Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach us About Judicial Power 
Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
pleading standards in Twombly is inconsistent with the Court’s rulings on summary judgment and 
removal). 
 11. Notably, even before Tellabs, Twombly, or Iqbal, some scholars argued that criminal 
procedure ought to be compared to civil procedure in order to “generate helpful insights and highlight 
overlooked possibilities.”  See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without 
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 
683, 687 (2006).  This Comment will focus entirely on federal criminal procedure, rather than 
examining criminal procedure in the state courts. 
3
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elucidates ways in which the Supreme Court erred in Twombly and 
Iqbal.  In these decisions, the Supreme Court created a confusing 
standard that imposes too great a burden on civil plaintiffs.  But one may 
also find solutions to these problems by further examining the probable 
cause jurisprudence.  This jurisprudence suggests that perhaps the new 
standard for civil pleading should be an objective inquiry, and plaintiffs 
should perhaps be able to secure something akin to a search warrant that 
would allow limited discovery in the early stages of a case. 
This Comment begins, in Part II, by laying out the general civil 
pleading standard in federal court, both before and after Twombly and 
Iqbal.  Part III explores the Supreme Court’s criminal pleading and 
probable cause jurisprudence.  Then, in Part IV, this Comment draws out 
the similarities between the new general civil pleading standard and 
probable cause.  Part V shows how probable cause jurisprudence may 
help courts and scholars better understand, critique, and build upon 
Twombly and Iqbal.  Finally, Part VI concludes by examining the 
methods for changing the new general civil pleading standard. 
II. THE GENERAL CIVIL PLEADING STANDARD IN FEDERAL COURT 
This Part discusses how the general civil pleading standard in federal 
court has evolved from the earliest days of modern civil pleading until 
after Iqbal.  Modern civil pleading may be dated to 1938, the year that 
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12  
Rule 8 is entitled “General Rules of Pleading,” and it continues today to 
govern civil pleadings in federal court.13  Rule 8 declares that a pleading 
must contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 
court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the 
relief sought.”14  Rule 8 also states that “[e]ach allegation must be 
simple, concise, and direct.”15  By using this language, the drafters 
sought to eliminate the formalism and hyper-technicality that marked 
earlier pleading regimes.16 
 12. Amber A. Pelot, Note, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere Adjustment or Stringent New 
Requirement in Pleading?, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2008) (“[T]he era of modern pleading 
began with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . in 1938 . . . .”). 
 13. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).  In Iqbal, the Supreme Court declared 
that Twombly was not a departure from Rule 8, but that “the decision was based on our interpretation 
and application of Rule 8.”  Id. at 1953. 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d). 
 16. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 551 (2002) (“In 1938, 
reacting to both the hypertechnical categorization of fact pleading under the codes and the sluggish 
4
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provide a method to 
dispose of pleadings that do not satisfy Rule 8.  Under Rule 12(b)(6), a 
defendant may move to dismiss pleadings that fail “to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.”17 
The Supreme Court elucidated these two Rules in a short 1957 
decision, Conley v. Gibson.18  The Court declared, in oft-quoted words, 
that federal courts should not dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) 
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”19  The 
Court further specified that the plaintiff could rely upon general 
allegations because “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require 
a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”20  
Rule 8 was only intended to ensure that the defendant had adequate 
notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the general grounds for that claim; the 
parties could flesh out the details in discovery.21 
Conley v. Gibson stood as the Supreme Court’s definitive statement 
on Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) for almost fifty years—until the Supreme Court 
decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly22 in 2007.  In Twombly the 
plaintiffs sued various telephone companies, called Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers (ILECs), for allegedly violating § 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.23  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that: (1) the ILECs 
engaged in parallel conduct that impeded other companies, called 
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs); and (2) the ILECs 
agreed not to compete against each other.24  The district court granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss.25  Relying upon Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language, the Second Circuit reversed.26 
The Supreme Court then reversed the Second Circuit and, in the 
process, adopted the “plausibility” standard for reviewing civil 
pleadings.  The Court began its legal analysis by noting that, in order to 
prove a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a plaintiff must show a 
formalism of common-law pleading, the drafters forged a new balance” with Rule 8.). 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 18. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 19. Id. at 45–46. 
 20. Id. at 47. 
 21. Id. at 47–48; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure “restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-
discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial.”). 
 22. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 23. Id. at 548–50.  The Sherman Antitrust Act can be found in the U.S. Code at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2006). 
 24. Twombly, 550 U.S. at  550–51. 
 25. Id. at 552. 
 26. Id. at 553. 
5
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conspiracy between companies to restrain trade.27  To show conspiracy, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate, not just that companies engaged in 
parallel conduct, but that they actually entered into an agreement to 
restrain trade.28  The Court further declared that, to survive a motion to 
dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint does not have to provide “detailed 
factual allegations,” but does have to provide more than just “labels,” 
“conclusions,” or a statement of the elements in the cause of action.29  
Thus, in the present case, the plaintiffs’ complaint had to contain: 
enough factual matter . . . to suggest that an agreement was made.  
Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not 
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply 
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.30 
If the plaintiffs could not supply some facts that suggested an agreement, 
then the plaintiffs could not push the complaint across the line between 
what is possible and what is plausible.31  Without a showing of 
plausibility, the Court was unwilling to allow cases to move forward 
into discovery, which can be both expensive and time-consuming.32 
In light of this analysis, the Court reexamined Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language.  One could construe this language very broadly to mean 
that “a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to 
dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff 
might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support 
recovery.”33  The Court rejected this broad interpretation, finding 
instead that Conley’s iconic statement meant only that “once a claim has 
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts 
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”34  Because Conley’s 
“no set of facts” language could be so confusing, the Court declared that 
the language had “earned its retirement, and it was “best forgotten.”35 
Turning to the case sub judice, the Supreme Court found that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint failed to create “a plausible suggestion of 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 553–54. 
 29. Id. at 555. 
 30. Id. at 556. 
 31. Id. at 557. 
 32. Id. at 558–59. 
 33. Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks removed).  Such an interpretation would obviously 
conflict with the Court’s newfound “plausibility” requirement. 
 34. Id. at 563. 
 35. Id. 
6
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conspiracy.”36  The complaint did contain some direct allegations of 
agreement, such as allegations that the ILECs had “engaged in a 
‘contract, combination or conspiracy’ and agreed not to compete with 
one another.”37  Yet these allegations were mere legal conclusions, not 
entitled to the Court’s consideration.38  Discounting these allegations, 
the complaint then rested entirely on allegations of parallel conduct, and 
such conduct could occur even in a competitive, free market, in the 
absence of any agreement.39  Because the plaintiffs had not “state[d] a 
claim . . . that [was] plausible on its face [and] [b]ecause the plaintiffs 
[had] not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible,” the Court held that the complaint had to be dismissed.40 
In response to this opinion, Justice Stevens dissented.41  He was 
especially perturbed that the majority granted dismissal without even 
requiring the defendants to file an answer or to submit to limited 
discovery.42  Justice Stevens argued that while the Court might be 
concerned with the costs of discovery, these concerns could be 
addressed through careful discovery management, rather than through 
granting a motion to dismiss.43 
Justice Stevens also examined the history of civil pleading, both in 
Great Britain and in the United States.44  Before the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, various rule systems required a plaintiff to plead “facts” 
and not mere “conclusions.”45  This distinction created great confusion, 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to abandon this 
distinction.  Thus, Rule 8 contains no reference to either “facts” or 
“conclusions.”46  According to Justice Stevens, the Rules were meant to 
keep litigants in, rather than out of, court.47 
In light of this history, Justice Stevens argued that Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language should be read broadly to mean that a court will dismiss 
a plaintiff’s complaint “only when proceeding to discovery or beyond 
 36. Id. at 566. 
 37. Id. at 564 & n.9 (quoting the plaintiffs’ complaint). 
 38. Id. at 564. 
 39. Id. at 564, 566–68. 
 40. Id. at 570. 
 41. Justice Ginsburg joined this dissenting opinion, except as to Part IV.  No other Justices 
dissented. 
 42. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 572–73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 573. 
 44. Id. at 573–76. 
 45. Id. at 574. 
 46. Id. at 575. 
 47. Id. 
7
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would be futile.”48  On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court, along 
with other federal and state courts, had championed such a broad reading 
of Conley.49  By deviating from this reading, the Twombly majority had 
misinterpreted Conley.50 
Turning to the present case, Justice Stevens found that the plaintiffs 
had three times alleged an agreement or conspiracy between the 
ILECs.51  The Court should have considered these allegations and 
should have regarded them as true.52  Instead, the Court improperly 
disposed of these allegations because they were supposedly 
“conclusory.”53  According to Justice Stevens, in the present case the 
allegations were sufficient to show that conspiracy was a “possibility,” 
and this showing was enough to survive a motion to dismiss.54  Thus, 
Justice Stevens would apparently have allowed at least limited 
discovery.55 
Courts and scholars immediately recognized Twombly as a 
groundbreaking opinion, but many were uncertain just how much 
ground the Supreme Court had broken.  Specifically, many wondered 
whether the majority opinion only applied to antitrust litigation56—or 
only applied to complicated litigation, which has high discovery costs.57  
Others speculated that the opinion applied to all civil litigation.58  
Shortly after deciding Twombly, the Court revisited the opinion in a 
short per curiam decision, Erickson v. Pardus,59 but the Court did not 
resolve whether Twombly’s holding applied only to certain types of 
cases or to all cases. 
In 2009, with Iqbal v. Ashcroft,60 the Supreme Court clarified that the 
 48. Id. at 577. 
 49. Id. at 577–78, 583–85. 
 50. Id. at 580 (“This is not and cannot be what the Conley Court meant.”). 
 51. Id. at 589.  Here, Justice Stevens provided a citation to the plaintiffs’ complaint, but he did 
not directly quote or paraphrase the three allegations he was referring to.  See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. at 589–90. 
 54. Id. at 592–93. 
 55. See id. at 593–94. 
 56. See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should not Change After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117 (2007) (arguing that Twombly only applies to antitrust 
litigation). 
 57. See, e.g., Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (2009) (“Courts in and out of the Sixth 
Circuit have identified uncertainty regarding the scope of Twombly and have indicated that its holding is 
likely limited to expensive, complicated litigation like that considered in Twombly.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F.Supp.2d 254, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The generality of 
[the] discussion [in Twombly] strongly suggests that Twombly applies more broadly to all civil cases 
rather than only to claims of antitrust conspiracy.”), aff’d, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 59. 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
 60. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
8
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latter interpretation was correct.61  In Iqbal, the plaintiff was a Pakistani 
Muslim arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for 
criminal charges in the months following September 11, 2001.  The 
plaintiff alleged that, while in custody, “he was deprived of various 
constitutional protections.”62  He sued numerous officials, including 
John Ashcroft, former U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, 
Director of the FBI, alleging that these officials adopted an 
unconstitutional policy that caused violations of his constitutional 
rights.63  Pursuant to this policy, the plaintiff was classified as “a person 
of high interest” and was confined under highly restrictive, harsh 
conditions because of his race, religion, or national origin, which he 
argued violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights.64 
This case came before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York in 2005, prior to the Supreme Court’s Twombly decision.  
The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, but the district court denied 
the motions, relying upon Conley’s “no set of facts” language.65  From 
this judgment, the Second Circuit took an interlocutory appeal.66  In the 
meantime, the Supreme Court decided Twombly.  The Second Circuit 
ultimately affirmed the denial of the motions, finding that, even after 
Twombly, plaintiffs only had to amplify certain types of claims with 
factual material in order to make the claims plausible.67 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Twombly’s framework 
applied to all claims in all civil cases because this framework was an 
interpretation of Rule 8, which governs all civil actions.68  Thus, in 
Iqbal, the Court applied the Twombly framework.  Looking to Twombly 
for guidance, the Court noted that its first task was to identify what a 
plaintiff must plead for the particular claim under consideration: 
unconstitutional discrimination.69  For unconstitutional discrimination, a 
plaintiff must plead discriminatory purpose.70 
 61. Id. at 1953. 
 62. Id. at 1942. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1944. 
 65. Id.; Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *9 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 
2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 66. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.  In most situations, a party cannot secure interlocutory appeal of a 
denial of a motion to dismiss, but a party is entitled to interlocutory appeal if the lower court, in denying 
the motion to dismiss, also rejected the defense of qualified immunity based on an issue of law.  Id. at 
1945–46. 
 67. Id. at 1944. 
 68. Id. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 69. Id. at 1947. 
 70. Id. at 1948. 
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The Court then distilled Twombly’s legal conclusions into two major 
principles.  First, although a court must accept all allegations as true, this 
requirement does not apply to legal conclusions or to a mere recitation 
of the elements for a cause of action.71  Second, a claim must be 
plausible to survive a motion to dismiss.  A claim is plausible “when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”72  The Court further stated that “[d]etermining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific 
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense.”73 
According to the Court, these two principles suggest a two-prong 
approach to evaluating motions to dismiss—an approach that the Court 
applied in Twombly.  First, a court should isolate conclusory statements, 
which are not entitled to the presumption of truth.  Second, a court 
should determine whether the remaining “well-pleaded factual 
allegations” make a showing of plausibility.74 
Applying this approach, the Court found that, in the present case, the 
complaint was not plausible.75  First, the Court disposed of conclusory 
allegations.  The plaintiff had alleged that the defendants “‘knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]’ to 
harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account 
of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate 
penological interest.’”76  The plaintiff had also alleged that Ashcroft was 
the “‘principal architect’” of this policy, and “Mueller was 
‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing” the policy.77  Because the 
Court regarded these statements as conclusory, the Court was not 
obligated to assume the statements were true.78 
The Court then applied the second prong.  It began this analysis by 
noting two well-pleaded factual allegations: (1) during investigations 
following September 11, 2001, Mueller directed the FBI to arrest and 
detain thousands of Arab Muslims; and (2) shortly after September 11, 
2001, Ashcroft and Mueller approved a policy of holding these Muslim 
detainees “‘in highly restrictive conditions of confinement’” until the 
 71. Id. at 1949–50. 
 72. Id. at 1949. 
 73. Id. at 1950. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1950–51. 
 76. Id. at 1951. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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FBI had cleared the detainees.79  According to the Court, such conduct 
might be consistent with an impermissible purpose to discriminate, but 
the conduct was more likely consistent with a legitimate policy of 
seeking out those connected with the September 11 attacks, especially 
because those who were known to be involved in the attacks were Arab 
Muslims.80  In light of this alternative explanation, the Court found that 
the plaintiff failed to show that his explanation was plausible; he failed 
to show that the defendants’ policies were the result of purposeful 
discrimination.81  Under these circumstances, the Court found that 
allowing limited discovery was an unacceptable way to resolve the 
motion to dismiss.  Instead, the Court was compelled to grant the 
motion.82 
In Iqbal, Justice Souter wrote a dissent in which Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.83  Justice Souter argued that the Court had 
misapplied Twombly because the Court had inappropriately applied the 
first prong of its analysis.84  Justice Souter did not regard as conclusory 
those statements that the majority had found conclusory.85  The majority 
had mistakenly read the individual allegations in isolation.86  Instead, 
the Court should have read each allegation in the context of the other 
allegations, which provide the necessary supporting details and facts.87  
In particular, the plaintiff alleged that after September 11, 2001, “the 
Chief of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section and the 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge for the FBI’s New York Field Office 
implemented a policy that discriminated against Arab Muslim men, 
including Iqbal, solely on account of their race, religion, or national 
origin.”88  This allegation provided the necessary factual detail to 
support the allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller created, knew about, 
and implemented this same policy.89  Justice Souter further averred that 
the allegations the majority regarded as conclusory could not be 
distinguished, in any principled way, from the allegations the majority 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1951–52. 
 82. Id. at 1953–54. 
 83. Notably, Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Twombly, and he was joined by Justice 
Breyer. 
 84. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955, 1960–61 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 1961. 
 86. Id. at 1960 (“The fallacy of the majority’s position, however, lies in looking at the relevant 
assertions in isolation.”). 
 87. Id. at 1960–61. 
 88. Id. at 1960. 
 89. Id. at 1961. 
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considered well-pleaded factual allegations.90  In sum, according to 
Justice Souter, the plaintiff’s complaint satisfied the requirements of 
Rule 8.91 
Writing by himself, Justice Breyer argued that, if the majority was 
concerned that discovery could devolve into unwarranted intrusion into 
the business of high-level officials, the proper solution was not 
reinterpreting Twombly and, thus, granting the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.  Instead, the plaintiff should have been allowed to conduct 
carefully controlled discovery.92 
III. CRIMINAL PLEADINGS AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
Focusing specifically on probable clause, this Part describes some 
basic tenets of criminal procedure in the federal courts, beginning with 
the investigative stage and ending with the pleading stage. 
In federal criminal cases, investigative and pretrial conduct is 
constrained by constitutional limitations93 and by the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.94  A single standard resonates, more than any other 
standard, throughout most of the investigative and pretrial stages; this 
standard is probable cause.95  Probable cause strikes a balance between 
society’s interest in crime control and an individual’s interest in liberty 
and privacy.96  In general, probable cause “exists where ‘the facts and 
circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they 
had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has 
been or is being committed.”97  The inquiry for probable cause varies 
somewhat in different circumstances, but the Supreme Court has stated 
that “‘[t]he substance of all the definitions’ of probable cause ‘is a 
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’”98 
The Supreme Court has often described the various attributes of 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1955. 
 92. Id. at 1961–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 93. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, and VI. 
 94. These Rules took effect in 1946.  George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: II, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 255 (1947). 
 95. In federal court, probable cause is used to evaluate search warrants, arrest warrants, 
complaints, and indictments.  See generally infra notes 106–125 and accompanying text.  Still, probable 
cause is not the only standard in this context.  For instance, reasonable suspicion governs investigative 
“stops.”  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 212–23 (4th ed. 2004). 
 96. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, 
SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 56 (2003). 
 97. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175–76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 98. Id. at 175 (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (Pa. 1881)). 
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probable cause.  First, as the definitions above make clear, probable 
cause is an objective concept based on facts.  Because it is based on 
particular facts, probable cause is context specific; it applies differently 
depending on the facts of the situation.99  Second, probable cause is 
“flexible,” “nontechnical,” “practical,” and a matter of “common-
sense.”100  These qualities ensure that probable cause may be easily 
applied by law enforcement and by juries.101  Even though probable 
cause is objective, when determining probable cause officers may look 
to their individual experiences to draw inferences from facts,102 and a 
court that reviews the officer’s conduct should defer to judgments based 
upon such experience.103  Third, probable cause is a matter of 
probabilities.104  The Supreme Court has refused to state exactly what 
probability is required by probable cause, though some commentators 
have found that the Supreme Court’s opinions suggest “a more-
probable-than-not test.”105 
During the investigative stage, probable cause limits the state’s vast 
investigative powers.  The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that 
law enforcement have probable cause before interfering with a citizen’s 
significant privacy or property interests.106  For a search, probable cause 
requires a showing not only that an offense has occurred, but also “that 
evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be 
searched.”107  Similarly, for an arrest, probable cause requires a showing 
not only that an offense has occurred, but also that the arrestee 
committed the offense.108 
Traditionally, law enforcement had to secure a search warrant, based 
on probable cause, before conducting a search.109  Although this warrant 
 99. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
 100. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996); Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–239; Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176. 
 101. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)); 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). 
 102. Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. 448, 448 (2008) (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700); 
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975). 
 103. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. 
 104. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. 
 105. LAFAVE, supra note 95, at 144. 
 106. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment ordinarily 
requires the degree of probability embodied in the term ‘probable cause’” before police conduct a 
search.). 
 107. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009). 
 108. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 n.6 (1978) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure: “The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . . Run Smooth,” 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255), 
superseded by statute, Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa-12). 
 109. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the 
13
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“requirement” has been eroded with exceptions, the Supreme Court still 
recognizes that it is preferable for law enforcement to secure a warrant 
from a magistrate judge before conducting a search.110  In evaluating 
warrant applications, the magistrate must be able to determine probable 
cause.  Because probable cause is fact-based, the magistrate cannot find 
probable cause based on someone else’s conclusory statements.111  For 
instance, in Nathanson v. United States, a customs agent applied for a 
search warrant simply by swearing that “‘he [had] cause to suspect 
and . . . believe’” that contraband would be found at a certain address.112  
A judge issued the warrant, but the Supreme Court found the warrant 
invalid because the warrant application did not provide the facts that 
would allow the judge to find probable cause.113  Even if a warrant 
application is full of detail, it still may be inadequate if it fails to provide 
the facts necessary to establish an essential element of probable cause or 
if it makes only a conclusory assertion regarding any essential element 
of probable cause.114 
Once the state has gathered sufficient evidence to arrest a person, this 
arrest may proceed by a number of different avenues.  First, in many 
cases, if police officers have probable cause, they may simply arrest the 
person.115  Second, the government may file a complaint or an 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 117 (2006) (“[T]he informed and deliberate 
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are 
permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers . . . .” (quoting 
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932))); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 (1983) 
(“Our cases hold that procedure by way of a warrant is preferred, although in a wide range of diverse 
situations we have recognized . . . exceptions to this requirement.”); see also BLOOM, supra note 96, at 
101–02 (discussing the increase in the breadth of exceptions to the warrant “requirement”). 
 111. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (“Sufficient information must be presented to 
the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification 
of the bare conclusions of others.”); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) (declaring that 
probable cause must be based on “facts or circumstances,” and the magistrate’s evaluation of a search 
warrant application must be more than a “[m]ere affirmance of [someone else’s] belief or suspicion”). 
 112. Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 44. 
 113. Id. at 47; see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 (“An officer’s statement that ‘affiants have received 
reliable information from a credible person and believe’ that heroin is stored in a home, 
is . . . inadequate.” (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964))). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1160 (2010).  In this case, the police submitted a 120-page affidavit as part of their application to a 
magistrate for a search warrant.  Id. at 1197.  In seeking a search warrant, an essential element is that 
evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place.  In this case, the police officer’s affidavit stated 
that the police had determined the suspect resided at 1441 N. Minnesota Street.  Id. at 1197, 1202.  But 
the police provided no facts to support this assertion.  Id. at 1203.  The court found that the magistrate 
could not have found probable cause for a search warrant based on this document, because the assertion 
regarding the address was conclusory.  Id. 
 115. See BLOOM, supra note 96, at 96–98 (discussing the situations where a warrant is or is not 
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information.  A magistrate then evaluates the complaint or information 
and, if the magistrate finds probable cause, the magistrate issues an 
arrest warrant for the person.116  Third, the government may convene a 
grand jury and seek an indictment.  The grand jury must determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been 
committed and the suspect committed it.  If the grand jury finds 
probable cause, the grand jury will issue an indictment.  When presented 
with this indictment, a court must issue an arrest warrant.117 
Once a suspect has been arrested, various documents may constitute 
the pleading or charging document, depending on the circumstances.  
For misdemeanors, the trial “may proceed on an indictment, 
information, or complaint.”118  An indictment is required for more 
serious crimes, those punishable by death or “by imprisonment for more 
than one year.”119 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 states that a complaint “is a 
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged.”120  It is “a sworn statement by a law enforcement officer that 
there is probable cause to believe a stated federal crime was committed 
by a named defendant.”121 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 provides the procedures for an 
indictment or information.  This Rule states that “[t]he indictment or 
information must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of 
the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”122  An information 
is an assertion, by a prosecutor, that there is probable cause to believe a 
crime was committed and the defendant committed it.123  Pursuant to the 
Fifth Amendment, an indictment cannot issue unless the evidence has 
been put to a grand jury124 and, in federal court, the grand jury is 
required in order to make a lawful arrest). 
 116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a). 
 117. FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958) (“[T]he grand 
jury’s determination that probable cause existed for the indictment also establishes that element for the 
purpose of issuing a warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged.”); KATHLEEN M. BRINKMAN 
& GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LITIGATION MANUAL 120–21 (2008). 
 118. FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(1). 
 119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(1). 
 120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3. 
 121. BRINKMAN & WEISSENBERGER, supra note 117, at 64. 
 122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). 
 123. BRINKMAN & WEISSENBERGER, supra note 117, at 108.  See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 117–19 (1975) (discussing whether a prosecutor’s “determination of probable cause” in an 
information is “sufficient alone to justify restraint of liberty pending trial”). 
 124. The Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
15
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required to find probable cause.125 
Complaints, informations, and indictments are similar documents.  
Notably, both Rule 3 and Rule 7 explicitly refer to pleading facts, but 
Rule 3 requires less.  Complaints must sometimes be prepared quickly, 
and thus the rule governing complaints is less stringent.126 
Some commentators have also noted the similarity in language 
between Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8.127  The drafters of the original Rules of Criminal Procedure 
made clear that they considered Civil Rule 8 when drafting Criminal 
Rule 7.128  Like Civil Rule 8, Criminal Rule 7 evidences a desire for 
simplified pleading.  Still, Criminal Rule 7 explicitly requires the 
pleading of facts, something that is notably absent from Civil Rule 8.129 
A defendant can challenge an indictment or information through a 
pretrial motion, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)(B), alleging a defect in the 
charging document.130  The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that an 
indictment must: (1) plead all the elements of a charge so that the 
indictment states a federal offense; and (2) notify the defendant of the 
charges so that the defendant can build his or her defense and can argue 
double jeopardy, if warranted.131  The defendant may move at any time 
to have the court invalidate an indictment or information, because it fails 
the first requirement, stating an offense.132 
Still, criminal charging documents are not very susceptible to such 
challenges.133  Generally, a federal court cannot invalidate an indictment 
that is valid on its face simply because the indictment is based on 
insufficient evidence.134  If a court invalidated such an indictment, the 
 125. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (A grand jury is responsible for 
determining “whether there is probable cause.”); BRINKMAN & WEISSENBERGER, supra note 117, at 
108; 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 10 n.33 (4th 
ed. 2006).  Some state courts allow an indictment to issue based on a showing that is different from 
probable cause.  LAFAVE, supra note 95, at 751. 
 126. BRINKMAN & WEISSENBERGER, supra note 117, at 58. 
 127. See LAFAVE, supra note 95, at 885. 
 128. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) advisory committee notes to 1944 adoption.  The advisory committee 
notes twice refer to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. 
 129. LAFAVE, supra note 95, at 885. 
 130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B). 
 131. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 
763–64 (1962). 
 132. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B). 
 133. BRINKMAN & WEISSENBERGER, supra note 117, at 153 (“Attacks on the institution of a 
prosecution are rarely successful . . . .  Defects in an indictment or information usually are harmless and 
can be cured by correction or redaction . . . .  If the defect is substantive, the government may obtain a 
superseding indictment or file a superseding information . . . .”). 
 134. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (“An indictment returned by a legally 
constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on 
16
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court would be usurping the grand jury’s role.135  Moreover, an 
indictment can be valid even if it only tracks the language of a criminal 
statute, as long as the pleading provides facts that are sufficient to put 
the defendant on notice.136  As for factual adornment, the Second 
Circuit, for instance, only requires a general statement of the time and 
place of the offense.137 
IV. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE NEW GENERAL CIVIL PLEADING 
STANDARD AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
This Part shows that the new general civil pleading standard is, in 
many regards, surprisingly similar to probable cause.  Still, similarities 
between civil and criminal pleading are not entirely of recent vintage.  
Even before Twombly and Iqbal, the civil complaint and the criminal 
indictment shared similar attributes.  As previously noted, Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 7 was modeled after Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8.  Both rules call for a plain and concise statement, although 
Criminal Rule 7 explicitly calls for a statement of facts.  Both civil 
complaints and criminal indictments must provide adequate notice and 
must plead all the elements necessary to make out a claim.  Indeed, 
before Twombly and Iqbal, these were the core functions of both civil 
complaints and criminal indictments.  Finally, civil and criminal 
defendants can move to dismiss pleading documents, and, before 
Twombly and Iqbal, reviewing courts applied a rather deferential 
standard to both civil complaints and criminal indictments. 
With Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court somewhat altered these 
dynamics, and the Court established a new general civil pleading 
standard that appears similar to probable cause.  First, the requisite 
inquiry is similar.  In Twombly, the Court stated that the new general 
civil pleading standard “calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”138  
This inquiry is similar to the inquiry for a search in criminal law.  There, 
the question is whether the facts are such that a reasonable person would 
be warranted in believing that an offense has been committed and 
evidence of the offense will be found in a particular place.139  In Iqbal, 
the merits.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974). 
 135. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 362–63 (quoting United States v. Reed, 27 F.Cas. 727, 738 (N.Y. 
Cir. Ct. 1852)). 
 136. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117–18 (1974). 
 137. See United States v. Elliott, 363 F. Supp. 2d 439, 450 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing United States 
v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 138. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 139. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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the Supreme Court declared that the inquiry for civil pleadings is 
whether the plaintiff has pleaded “factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”140  This inquiry is similar to the inquiry for a 
criminal arrest.  For an arrest, the facts must be such that a reasonable 
person would be warranted in believing that an offense has occurred and 
that the defendant committed it.141  The statement in Iqbal is also 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement that the substance of 
probable cause is a reasonable ground for believing that a defendant is 
guilty.142  Notably, the Supreme Court has not stated that “plausibility” 
analysis is an objective inquiry like probable cause; it is not necessarily 
based on what a “reasonable person” would do.  Yet, in general, the 
“plausibility” inquiry is strikingly similar to probable cause because: (1) 
it must be based on facts; (2) it must be guided by or based upon reason; 
and (3) the ultimate question is whether misconduct has been 
committed, whether the defendant committed it, and whether evidence 
of the misconduct might be discovered. 
Second, the Supreme Court has also made clear that “plausibility” is a 
context-specific inquiry that should be guided by experience and 
common sense.143  The Court has made the same statements about 
probable cause.144  Yet, the Court has typically only invited law 
enforcement officers, and not judges, to rely upon their experience when 
figuring probable cause.145  With Twombly and Iqbal, the Court invited 
judges to rely upon their experience.146 
Third, the Supreme Court has stated that conclusory statements are 
not entitled to an assumption of truth in applying the “plausibility” 
standard.147  Likewise, when magistrate judges consider probable cause 
applications, they cannot rely upon purely conclusory assertions.148 
Finally, “plausibility” analysis seems to be a matter of probabilities, 
much like probable cause.  True, the Supreme Court has stated that the 
“plausibility” standard “does not impose a probability requirement.”149  
 140. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
 141. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 143. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 144. See supra notes 99–100, 102–103 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“[T]he reviewing court [should] draw on its judicial 
experience . . . .”). 
 147. Id. (“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of 
truth.”). 
 148. See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text. 
 149. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).  But, as Professor Darrell Miller 
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This statement, however, does not make sense without understanding 
what “plausibility” and “probability” mean.150  “Plausibility” means that 
something is “seemingly true,” but the term also often implies 
disbelief.151  “Probable” means that something is reasonably likely.152  If 
an incident may be explained in two or more ways, one might suppose 
that several of the explanations could be plausible, even if the 
explanations directly conflict, especially if each explanation is viewed in 
isolation.  That is, several explanations could seem to be true.  In 
addition, one explanation could be probable or likely, and another could 
still be plausible.  In other words, if one explanation is probable, this 
explanation does not necessarily render other explanations 
implausible.153 
These arguments can be illustrated through the facts of Iqbal.  In 
Iqbal, the Court declared that it had found the “likely” (i.e. probable) 
explanation for why the federal government arrested so many Arab 
Muslims following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: The 
terrorists were mostly Arab Muslims.154  Even if this is true, alternative 
explanations may still be plausible.  For instance, discrimination may 
still be plausible.  It may still seem to be a true, valid explanation in this 
case: Following September 11, 2001, Ashcroft and Mueller may have 
developed a fear and hatred towards Arab Muslims, because in attacking 
the Pentagon and planning an attack on the White House, Arab Muslims 
sought to bring down the very government in which Ashcroft and 
Mueller were leading officials.  Thus, Ashcroft and Mueller decided to 
arrest and detain Arab Muslims for two interrelated reasons: (1) Arab 
Muslims had committed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; and 
(2) Ashcroft and Mueller hated and feared Arab Muslims. 
Yet, in both Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court applied a type of 
“comparative plausibility” that seems to actually impose a probability 
has pointed out, simply “couching the pleading standard as plausibility rather than probability” does not 
ensure that judges avoid “erroneous judicial decisions” by applying a standard that is similar to or 
tantamount to probability.  Miller, supra note 10, at 1006. 
 150. Here, this Comment analyzes the “plausibility” standard in a somewhat technical fashion.  
This technical analysis is necessary in order to understand what quantum of proof the “plausibility” 
standard requires.  Nevertheless, this Comment is not suggesting that courts should normally analyze 
“plausibility” in a technical manner when such courts consider a motion to dismiss.  This Comment 
argues that courts should, instead, evaluate “plausibility” in a non-technical manner.  See infra Part V.A. 
 151. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1091 (2d College ed. 1979). 
 152. Id. at 1132. 
 153. Take, as an example, a duck-billed platypus.  This creature is a mammal with a “duck bill.”  
Mammals cannot be birds.  The two categories are mutually exclusive.  If there were a creature very 
similar to a platypus, one might say the creature is likely a mammal.  The same person could rationally 
conclude, with a hint of disbelief, that it seems to be true that the creature is a bird. 
 154. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009). 
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standard.  The Court compared two explanations155 for the conduct at 
issue and, finding that one explanation was “natural,” “obvious,” or 
“likely,” the Court determined that the other explanation could not be 
“plausible.”156  In practice, the Court’s “plausibility” analysis seems to 
become a matter of probabilities.  For probability, if one explanation is 
sixty percent likely, then other (mutually exclusive) explanations are 
only forty percent likely.  In other words, if one explanation is probable, 
then any other (mutually exclusive) explanation is necessarily 
improbable. 
Supposing the Court’s “plausibility” analysis is a matter of 
probabilities, the next question is what level of probability.  In Iqbal, the 
Court found that one explanation was more likely than not (i.e. more 
than fifty percent), and this finding rendered the alternative explanation 
implausible.  In this case, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the 
facts supported only two explanations, and the Court treated these 
explanations as mutually exclusive:157 (1) the defendant’s conduct was 
motivated by an impermissible discriminatory intent; or (2) the 
defendant’s conduct was not motivated at all by discriminatory intent, 
but simply motivated by a desire to catch terrorists who were Arab 
 155. In both Twombly and Iqbal, the Court dealt with only two explanations.  The Court has not 
clarified what would happen if there were more explanations.  Perhaps the Supreme Court intends for 
lower courts to only consider two options.  Ostensibly, these two options would always be: (1) the 
plaintiff’s explanation; and (2) the strongest alternative explanation. 
 156. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567–68 (2007); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–
52.  In Twombly, the Court found “a natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged.”  550 U.S. at 
568.  This “obvious alternative explanation” was normal competitive behavior.  Id. at 567.  This 
explanation seemingly rendered the plaintiffs’ explanation implausible.  In Iqbal, the Court wrote: 
[T]hese allegations are consistent with [the defendants’] purposefully designating 
detainees “of high interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin.  But given 
more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.  The September 11 
attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members 
in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group.  Al Qaeda was headed by 
another Arab Muslim—Osama bin Laden—and composed in large part of his Arab 
Muslim disciples.  It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law 
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks 
would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose 
of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.  On the facts [the plaintiff] 
alleges[,] the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his 
nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States 
and who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts.  As between 
that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for the arrests and the purposeful, invidious 
discrimination [the plaintiff] asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible 
conclusion. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52 (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
 157. Yet, this Comment has already shown that the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. 
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Muslims.158  Because these are the only two options and the Court 
treated them as mutually exclusive, their probabilities must add up to 
one hundred precent.  According to the Court, the second explanation 
was “likely” (i.e. more than fifty percent), and this made the first 
explanation implausible.  Simple algebra indicates that, under the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, an explanation becomes implausible 
when it is less than fifty percent likely, and seemingly, an explanation 
becomes plausible when it is at least fifty percent likely—or “more 
likely than not.”  Commentators have attributed this same quantum of 
proof to probable cause.159  In sum, although the Supreme Court claims 
that “plausibility” analysis is not a matter of probabilities, the Supreme 
Court’s practice in Twombly and Iqbal suggests that “plausibility” 
analysis is a matter of probabilities, and “plausibility” analysis imposes 
the same quantum of proof—more likely than not—that probable cause 
demands in criminal cases. 
V. DISCUSSION: VIEWING THE NEW GENERAL CIVIL PLEADING STANDARD 
THROUGH THE PRISM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
This Part has three subsections: (A) better understanding the new 
general civil pleading standard; (B) criticizing the new general civil 
pleading standard; and (C) improving the new general civil pleading 
standard. 
A. Better Understanding the New General Civil Pleading Standard 
If “plausibility” analysis is similar to probable cause, lower courts 
should be able to easily apply “plausibility” analysis.  After all, most 
judges are familiar with the concept of probable cause, and they feel 
comfortable applying this concept.160 
Yet, “plausibility” analysis is not utterly tantamount to probable 
cause.  If “plausibility” analysis were simply probable cause, then the 
Supreme Court would ostensibly state this fact.  Instead, the Supreme 
Court has denied some of the similarities between “plausibility” analysis 
and probable cause, declaring for instance that “plausibility” analysis is 
not a matter of probabilities.  This Comment shows that the Supreme 
Court’s actual practice undercuts this averment.  Still, courts cannot 
simply apply probable cause in the place of “plausibility” analysis. 
Courts can, however, better understand the meaning of particular 
 158. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 159. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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aspects of “plausibility” analysis by looking to similar aspects of 
probable cause—and to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on these 
aspects of probable cause.  One such aspect is experience and common 
sense.  In Iqbal, the Supreme Court declared that a reviewing court 
should “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” when 
figuring “plausibility.”161  The Supreme Court has not clarified exactly 
how lower courts should apply “common sense” and “judicial 
experience” in “plausibility” analysis.  Some commentators have 
lamented that these terms make “plausibility” analysis highly 
subjective,162 or that the terms seem to “permit judges to use their own 
opinions to assess the sufficiency of facts to decide motions to 
dismiss.”163  Yet, the Supreme Court has used similar language in 
describing probable cause, even though probable cause is an objective 
concept.164  Thus, the Supreme Court’s statement in Iqbal does not 
necessarily mean that “plausibility” analysis is utterly subjective or even 
highly subjective. 
In the context of probable cause, “common sense” does not seem to 
denote a body of substantive knowledge, but rather a method of analysis 
used by ordinary people.  The Supreme Court often lists “common 
sense” alongside such terms as “practical” and “non-technical.”165  In 
like manner, the Court contrasts “common sense” with terms such as 
“hypertechnical.”166  The Court is making the point that probable cause 
should be applied in a non-technical manner, in a manner that is simple, 
easy, and intuitive.  Probable cause is thus not a matter of discrete 
elements that must be carefully analyzed at great length.167  Probable 
cause is neither esoteric nor arcane.  By making probable cause a matter 
of common sense, the Supreme Court intends to make probable cause 
 161. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 162. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 624 (2010) (The Court’s language is a “highly subjective 
directive.”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 530 
(2010) (The Court’s language “necessarily adds a more subjective element to a district court’s 
assessment of whether a plaintiff’s claim should go forward.”); Blair-Stanek, supra note 10, at 39 n.322 
(“Experience and common sense inherently invite a subjective analysis.”). 
 163. Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal 
and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 31 (2010). 
 164. LAFAVE, supra note 95, at 143 (“The probable cause test . . . is an objective one.”). 
 165. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 166. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (“[W]hen a magistrate has found 
probable cause [to issue a warrant], the [reviewing] courts should not invalidate the warrant by 
interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.”). 
 167. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (“In dealing with probable 
cause, . . . we deal with probabilities.  These are not technical; they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”). 
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accessible to, and comprehensible to, those lacking formal legal 
training—particularly police officers and jurors.168  In this context, when 
the Court writes about “common sense,” the Court is not calling on 
judges to use some idiosyncratic brand of common sense.  Instead, the 
Court is calling on judges to apply probable cause in a way that 
“practical people”169 or “reasonable and prudent men”170 would apply 
the concept—so that everyday people can understand and apply the 
concept.  These dictates are consistent with an objective standard, where 
“objective standard” means “[a] legal standard that is based on conduct 
and perceptions external to a particular person.”171 
“Experience” is another term that the Supreme Court employs in the 
probable cause context.  Law enforcement officers are allowed to use 
their experience when drawing inferences from facts.172  If one closely 
examines Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, one finds that officers 
are primarily (if not exclusively) supposed to draw on their training and 
experience as law enforcement officers, rather than drawing on all of 
their life experiences.173  Thus, “experience” is less of a call to 
subjectivity than it might at first seem.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stated that, even if probable cause depends on “experience,” 
probable cause is an objective concept.174  Probable cause should 
therefore be understood as asking: given the facts and circumstances in 
this case, what would a reasonable person in the position of the police 
officer do?175 
 168. See Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108 (“[A]ffidavits for search warrants . . . must be tested and 
interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion.  They are normally drafted 
by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.  Technical requirements of elaborate 
specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.”). 
 169. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human 
behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are law enforcement officers.  
Finally, the evidence . . . must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as 
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”). 
 170. See supra note 167. 
 171. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (8th ed. 2004). 
 172. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 692, 699 (1996) (noting that an officer had “25 
years of law enforcement experience” and that officers view “facts through the lens of . . . police 
experience and expertise”); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (“[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes 
deductions—inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”); United States v. 
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975) (Border patrol officers may draw on “their prior experience with aliens 
and smugglers.”); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (same). 
 174. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 166 n.2 (1992) (stating that probable cause is 
objective); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982) (“[T]he probable-cause determination must 
be based on objective facts . . . .”); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (Probable cause is “an 
objective standard.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 175. A similar objective standard is used in other contexts, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 
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This probable cause jurisprudence may help one understand 
“plausibility” analysis.  For “plausibility” analysis, the Supreme Court 
has commanded lower courts to use common sense, but the Court has 
provided little guidance in describing what this requires.176  In the 
probable cause context, “common sense” denotes a practical, non-
technical approach that is comprehensible to ordinary people; “common 
sense” is a rejection of formal legal analysis. 
For several reasons, the Supreme Court seems to embrace this 
definition of common sense in the context of “plausibility” analysis.  
First, in both Twombly and Iqbal, the Court stressed that “‘a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not’” enable a 
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.177  Thus, the Court made clear 
that lower courts cannot apply a technical analysis that simply looks for 
a statement of each element in the cause of action.  Instead, courts must 
apply a common sense approach that goes beyond confirming that each 
element is stated in the complaint.  Second, in Conley, the Supreme 
Court interpreted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 as a rejection of 
the formalism that allowed courts to dismiss complaints on overly 
technical grounds.178  In Twombly, the Court unequivocally abandoned 
portions of Conley.179  In Iqbal, the Court made clear that, although it 
had abandoned parts of Conley, it was not returning to the formalism 
and technicality of the pre-Conley era.  The majority explicitly 
804(b)(3), qualified immunity, and the Model Penal Code’s negligence standard.  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(3) examines what “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would” or would not 
do.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).  Likewise, in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987), the 
Supreme Court cast the qualified immunity inquiry as “the objective (albeit fact-specific) question 
whether a reasonable officer could have believed [that the defendant’s] warrantless search [was] lawful, 
in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.”  For negligence, 
the Model Penal Code states in part: 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, 
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, 
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the actor’s situation. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2001). 
 176. The Twombly majority only once used the phrase “common sense.”  In a footnote, the 
majority quoted and then rebuffed the dissent, which referred to “the common sense of Adam Smith” in 
order to argue that the majority should reach a different conclusion.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 567 n.12 (2007).  The Iqbal majority also only once used the phrase “common sense”—
when the Court stated that reviewing courts should draw on their “judicial experience and common 
sense.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
 177. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 178. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that 
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome . . . .”), 
abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 179. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (Conley’s “no set of facts” language “has earned its retirement.  
The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”). 
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reaffirmed that Rule 8 was a “departure from the hyper-technical, code-
pleading regime of a prior era,” and just two sentences after this 
statement, the Court stated that lower courts must use common sense 
when evaluating civil complaints.180 
In the context of “plausibility” analysis, the Supreme Court has also 
called on reviewing courts to use their “judicial experience.”  Some 
writers have suggested that “judicial experience” is tantamount to “legal 
experience,” “personal experience,” or “life experience.”181  These 
interpretations are incorrect.  Courts should construe “judicial 
experience” so that its meaning is similar to “law enforcement 
experience” in the context of probable cause.  In other words, the 
Supreme Court is not asking judges to draw upon all their life 
experiences, but just to draw on their experiences as judges.182  This 
 180. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.  Some courts have indeed adopted an academic or technical 
approach to reviewing motions to dismiss.  See Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. 
1993) (en banc) (A motion to dismiss “is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to determine if the 
facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action.”).  The U.S. Supreme Court seemingly 
rejected this approach in Iqbal when the Court called for “common sense.” 
 181. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 
516 (2010) (seemingly treating “judicial experience” as “life experience” and exploring the idea that 
“[d]ifferent judges with different life experiences will . . . reach different conclusions about 
plausibility”); Jay S. Goodman, Two, New, U.S. Supreme Court Cases Raise the Question: Is Notice 
Pleading Dead?, R.I. B.J., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 5, 9 (“The ‘context’ based ‘plausibility’ standard, in which 
judges apply their experience and common sense would seem to lead to different outcomes based upon 
the differences among District Court judges in [legal] experiences (tort lawyers versus corporate 
lawyers) . . . .”); Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Labor and 
Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 282 (2009) (discussing “personal experience” in 
the context of “judicial experience” and stating that “[t]he risk of applying [judicial experience and 
common sense] in employment discrimination litigation is that it will bring to the fore the experiences 
and assumptions . . . of the reviewing judge about whether discrimination is a continuing problem in the 
workplace as a general matter”). 
 182. The Supreme Court implicitly illustrated the distinction between these two types of 
experience in a death penalty case.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  In this case, Justice 
White drew upon what might be called his judicial experience, and he concurred in the judgment of the 
Court.  He stated that his conclusion in this case was: 
based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances of hundreds 
and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the 
authorized penalty.  That conclusion . . . is that the death penalty is exacted with great 
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is 
not. 
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring in judgment); see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in judgment) (“[J]ust as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in Furman on his 
extensive exposure to countless cases for which death is the authorized penalty, I have relied on my own 
experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty” violates the Eighth 
Amendment). 
  In Furman, Justice Marshall also concurred in the judgment, but he seemed to draw upon a 
wider array of experiences in order to arrive at this conclusion.  Marshall asked himself whether capital 
punishment “is morally acceptable to the American public,” and he answered this question by examining 
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interpretation is most consistent with the plain language of the term 
“judicial experience.”  Thus, in a discrimination case, judges are not 
necessarily supposed to ask themselves: have I ever been the subject of 
the type of discrimination alleged in this complaint?  But they may ask: 
in my judicial experience, when a plaintiff pleads facts such as the facts 
being pleaded in this case, is the plaintiff ever able to ultimately prove 
discrimination?183  In other words, judges are only supposed to draw on 
a limited scope of life experiences. 
Still, in Twombly, the Court suggested at one point that, when courts 
evaluate motions to dismiss, they are permitted to draw on a broader 
array of experiences.  The Court stated it was drawing on “common 
economic experience” in order to decide Twombly.184  Yet, one must 
remember that Iqbal clarified Twombly and, arguably, it reinterpreted 
Twombly.185  Thus, the Court displaced its earlier dicta concerning 
“common economic experience” with its more recent statement 
concerning “judicial experience.”  And this latter statement ought, 
rightly, to be given its plain and obvious meaning. 
In sum, when the Supreme Court wrote of “judicial experience and 
common sense” in Iqbal, the Court was not necessarily calling for utter 
subjectivity in “plausibility” analysis.  Instead, by employing the term 
“common sense,” the Court may simply have been directing lower 
courts to apply “plausibility” in a non-technical way that makes the 
analysis accessible and comprehensible to ordinary people.  In addition, 
his own life experiences: 
[J]udges have not lived lives isolated from a broad range of human experience.  They 
have come into contact with many people, many ways of life, and many philosophies.  
They have learned to share with their fellow human beings common views of morality.  
If . . . judges conclude that these people would not knowingly tolerate a specific penalty 
in light of its costs, then this conclusion is entitled to weight. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 369 n.163 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). 
 183. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 10, at 34 (“Judicial experience” is the experience “of seeing the 
dispositions of similar cases.”).  This inquiry is quite similar to the inquiry sometimes employed when a 
defendant moves for summary judgment: viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
could a reasonable jury find for the plaintiff at trial?  See Thomas, supra note 163, at 20 (discussing 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).  Thus, as other scholars have 
noted, Twombly and Iqbal have made motions to dismiss more like motions for summary judgment.  See 
id. at 29–31; Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become 
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2007); see also Thomas, supra note 
10, at 1857 (“In Twombly and Tellabs, the Court established standards for dismissal at the motion to 
dismiss stage that are similar to the standard for summary judgment.”). 
 184. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (The “sufficiency [of the complaint] turns on the suggestions 
raised by [the ILECs’ parallel behavior] when viewed in light of common economic experience.”). 
 185. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Twombly, and he believed that, in Iqbal, the 
majority misapplied the pleading standard he had enunciated in Twombly.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  Likewise, Justice Breyer joined the majority in Twombly, but joined the dissent 
in Iqbal. 
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by employing “judicial experience,” the Court was not giving judges a 
license to draw upon all of their life experiences, but only upon their 
experiences as judges.  Thus, this may only inject a modicum of 
subjectivity into the “plausibility” analysis.  Moreover, in the context of 
probable cause, the Supreme Court has allowed consideration of 
“common sense” and “experience,” and yet probable cause remains an 
objective concept.  Probable cause seems to call for this inquiry: given 
the facts and circumstances in this case, what would a reasonable person 
in the position of the police officer do?  The Supreme Court could adopt 
a similar objective standard for “plausibility” analysis, though the Court 
has not yet explicitly done so. 
B. Criticizing the New General Civil Pleading Standard 
In addition to helping elucidate the new general civil pleading 
standard, criminal procedure can be compared to civil pleading in order 
to highlight problems and inconsistencies with the new civil pleading 
standard.  First, when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are read 
together with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these rules suggest 
that civil litigants should not be required to adorn their pleadings with 
facts.  When Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 was promulgated, the 
drafters looked to and considered Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.186  
The drafters decided to adopt, for the criminal rules, language requiring 
the pleading of specific facts.187  This decision reflects the drafters’ 
understanding that Civil Rule 8 did not require the pleading of specific 
facts.  This decision also shows how easily and explicitly a requirement 
of fact-pleading may be made.  Simply because the civil rules do not 
explicitly require fact-pleading, one may assume that Civil Rule 8 was 
not intended to require fact-pleading. 
Logic also confirms that, while the government may be required to 
plead facts in a criminal case, a private litigant should not be required to 
do so in a civil case.  The government possesses vast resources that may 
be allocated toward fact-gathering in a criminal case.188  True, the 
 186. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 187. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c). 
 188. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 46 (1981) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he State . . . commands great investigative and prosecutorial 
resources . . . .”); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in result) 
(“[T]he Constitution recognized the awesome power of indictment and the virtually limitless resources 
of government investigators.”); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 291 & n.6 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (“The State . . . [has] access to superior investigative resources . . . .”).  See also Britt v. 
North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 236 n.7 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (comparing the State’s vast 
investigative resources to the relatively meager resources available to the average criminal defendant). 
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government is restrained by the Fourth Amendment, whereas private 
individuals are not.  Nevertheless, one must view the Fourth 
Amendment in context—as a restraint on an otherwise incredibly far-
reaching power to investigate.189  Thus, the government should be 
required, in preparing an indictment, to provide the facts establishing 
probable cause and to lay out a factually-adorned pleading. 
A private litigant simply is not in the same position as the government 
to investigate and gather facts.  A private litigant often does not have the 
same vast resources or the same amount of investigative power.  Thus, 
by requiring fact-pleading from private litigants, the Supreme Court is 
placing an unfair burden on these litigants. 
A second comparison between civil and criminal pleading comes 
from the different definitions of probable cause.  For a search, probable 
cause requires a showing that a reasonable person would be justified in 
believing that a crime was committed and that evidence of that crime 
may be found at a particular place.190  For an arrest, probable cause 
requires a showing that a reasonable person would be justified in 
believing that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed 
the crime.191  Grand juries employ this latter definition when they 
consider whether to issue an indictment allowing a prosecution to move 
forward.  Thus, in criminal law, at the point where a grand jury is 
convened, the central question is whether an offense has occurred and 
whether the defendant committed it.192 
In Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court presented two inquiries for 
“plausibility” analysis.  As this Comment shows above, one inquiry is 
similar to a search inquiry, and the other is similar to an arrest inquiry.  
In Twombly, the Court stated that the issue was whether the plaintiff had 
provided sufficient facts to make it plausible that discovery would reveal 
evidence of illegal agreement.193  This inquiry is similar to a search 
inquiry, and it seems like the wrong question to ask when considering 
whether a case is viable at the pleading stage.  Instead, the focus should 
be on whether misconduct has been committed and whether the 
defendant committed it. 
The Supreme Court has created potential problems by adopting a 
search inquiry at the pleading stage of civil actions.  Ostensibly, a court 
 189. As Justice Douglas famously noted, the Fourth Amendment places a necessary restraint on 
the government’s otherwise “untrammeled power to invade one’s home and to seize one’s person.”  See 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 671 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 190. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 192. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (“A grand jury has broad investigative 
powers to determine whether a crime has been committed and who has committed it.”). 
 193. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
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could find that a plaintiff’s claim, as presented in the civil complaint, is 
not plausible—but the court could find plausible that, if the case goes 
forward to discovery, evidence of misconduct will be found.  Take, for 
example, a case where the plaintiff has been injured by the employee of 
a company, and the identify of the employee is unknown.194  The 
company is not cooperative with the plaintiff, and the company denies 
any wrongdoing.  The plaintiff sues the company under the theory of 
respondeat superior,195 even though he does not plead facts that would 
make plausible the assumption that the company is liable under this 
theory.  For instance, the plaintiff might not plead facts showing that the 
alleged misconduct occurred within the scope of employment, which is a 
necessary prerequisite for respondeat superior liability.196  Still, the 
plaintiff might also plead facts strongly suggesting that the company 
possesses the documents that could determine who is liable.  In other 
words, it is plausible that, if this case continues to discovery, evidence of 
liability will be found.  The Court does not make utterly clear in 
Twombly or Iqbal whether such a case could survive a motion to 
dismiss, but presumably it would not. 
A final comparison arises from the quantum of proof required by 
“plausibility” analysis.  As this Comment demonstrates, this quantum of 
proof seems to become, when the Supreme Court actually applies 
“plausibility” analysis, tantamount to more-likely-than-not, the same 
quantum of proof that is required for probable cause.  This quantum of 
proof makes sense at the pleading stage in the criminal context because 
the stakes are high for a criminal defendant.  The defendant faces the 
potential of losing his or her liberty.  Moreover, the quantum of proof at 
the pleading stage is less than the quantum ultimately required for 
conviction, where the standard for conviction is “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”197 
These considerations do not apply in civil actions.  Civil defendants 
do not face the potential loss of liberty, but only the potential loss of 
time, money, and reputation.  Moreover, the quantum of proof at trial is, 
 194. This hypothetical is based, in part, on Smith v. Troyer Potato Prods., No. 74522, 1999 WL 
561552 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 1999) (plaintiff was riding a motorcycle and was hit by a truck that 
allegedly bore the defendant company’s name, even though the company denied having a truck in the 
area at that time, and the plaintiff could not establish the identity of the driver). 
 195. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “‘an employer is subject to liability for torts 
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1958 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 
(2005)). 
 196. Id. 
 197. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
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in most civil actions, by a preponderance of the evidence.198  Thus, it 
seems foolish, or at least unfair, to weigh the evidence according to this 
same quantum of proof (more-likely-than-not) at both the pleading stage 
and at the end of trial.199 
C. Improving the New General Civil Pleading Standard 
This Comment has shown that one may use criminal pleading 
jurisprudence in order to elucidate the faults with civil “plausibility” 
analysis.  This same jurisprudence also suggests at least three ways to 
improve “plausibility” analysis.  First, the Supreme Court has not 
expressly made “plausibility” analysis an objective inquiry, but this 
Comment shows that the Court could adopt an objective (“reasonable 
person”) inquiry and could still require that courts apply common sense 
and judicial experience.  This objective inquiry would ask the following 
question: taking all the non-conclusory allegations of this complaint as 
true, would a reasonable person with the judicial experience of this 
reviewing court find it plausible that misconduct occurred and that the 
defendant is liable for that misconduct?  Courts would also apply this 
inquiry in a common sense manner.  If the Supreme Court adopted this 
standard, the Court could ostensibly quiet many critics of “plausibility” 
analysis, who feel that the current standard is too subjective.200  
Moreover, commentators often consider objectivity, alongside fairness 
and consistency, as a fundamental value of courts and legal systems.201  
Thus, the Court could increase judicial legitimacy if it adopted this 
objective inquiry. 
Still, this inquiry does present some potential problems.  By adding 
the objective component, the inquiry begins to closely resemble the 
inquiry for summary judgment: viewing all the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, could a reasonable jury find for the 
non-moving party?202  Other authors have suggested that, if the motion 
 198. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (“In a typical civil suit for 
money damages, plaintiffs must prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 199. Still, this Comment is not arguing that the procedures for evaluating a motion to dismiss a 
civil complaint are tantamount to the procedures used to weigh the evidence at trial.  As the Supreme 
Court has noted in the criminal context, probable cause is not a “’finely tuned,’” technical standard, 
“comparable to the standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
235 (1983)). 
 200. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text. 
 201. See, e.g., Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1017, 1032 (2004) (Objectivity is among “[t]he core values of courts.”). 
 202. See supra note 183. 
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to dismiss takes the form of the motion for summary judgment, then the 
motion to dismiss may violate the Seventh Amendment right to trial by 
jury.203  However, authors have also argued that Twombly and Iqbal 
inevitably create these clashes with the Seventh Amendment.204  In other 
words, the proposals in this Comment do not produce a new conflict 
with the Seventh Amendment; they simply suffer from the inevitable 
Seventh Amendment conflicts that follow from Twombly and Iqbal.  
This Comment does not attempt to directly address or resolve these 
conflicts because they are beyond the Comment’s scope.205 
Besides constitutional concerns, additional problems are created when 
the motion to dismiss becomes similar to the motion for summary 
judgment.  As one scholar has argued, “[i]t may not be appropriate to 
treat summary judgment and the motion to dismiss similarly because of 
the difference in the availability of discovery under the motions, the 
difference in cost surrounding the motions, and the difference in the role 
of the courts under the motions.”206 
This Comment addresses some of these additional concerns by 
proposing a second improvement to “plausibility” analysis: discovery 
should be more readily available before a court rules on a motion to 
dismiss.  If civil plaintiffs must now plead facts, they should be able to 
conduct some form of discovery in order to uncover those facts.  They 
should be able to secure something like a search warrant or a warrant to 
conduct limited discovery before a court rules on a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss,207 and perhaps even before suit is filed.208  Litigants would 
 203. See Thomas, supra note 10, at 1857, 1871–1872 (arguing that the motion to dismiss has 
become similar to the motion for summary judgment and that the motion to dismiss now violates the 
Seventh Amendment).  See also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 139 (2007).  If summary judgment is unconstitutional, as Thomas argues, then a motion to 
dismiss, in the form of a motion for summary judgment, would also be unconstitutional. 
 204. Klein, Seventh Amendment, supra note 10, at 481 (“Iqbal inevitably clashes with the Seventh 
Amendment.”); Klein, Rule 8, supra note 10, at 287 (“Twombly took [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 
8 on a path that could not be squared with the Seventh Amendment, as interpreted under the historical 
test.”). 
 205. The curious reader may refer to existing scholarship on this topic.  See Klein, Seventh 
Amendment, supra note 10; Klein, Rule 8, supra note 10; Thomas, supra note 10. 
 206. Thomas, supra note 163, at 41–42.  For an argument that motions to dismiss should 
sometimes be treated like motions for summary judgment, see Epstein, supra note 183. 
 207. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, 
where a civil complaint is weak, the solution in some cases is to allow limited discovery).  Notably, 
courts do sometimes allow discovery before ruling on other 12(b) motions such as a 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a 12(b)(4) motion to dismiss for insufficient process, a 
12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, and a 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss for 
failure to join a party under Rule 19.  See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1350, 1353 (3d ed. 2004); 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1359 (3d ed. 2004). 
 208. See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of Presuit 
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petition a court for such a warrant, and the court would employ an 
objective inquiry to determine if the warrant should issue.209  This 
inquiry could have the following form: taking all the non-conclusory 
allegations of this complaint as true, would a reasonably prudent person 
with the judicial experience of this reviewing court find it plausible that 
limited discovery of this defendant would yield evidence of liability for 
the acts alleged in the complaint? 
Finally, this Comment shows that “plausibility” analysis, as applied 
by the Supreme Court, becomes a matter of more-likely-than-not 
probability.  This standard is too high.  The error does not lie in the way 
that the Supreme Court has described “plausibility” analysis, but rather 
in the way that the Supreme Court has applied this analysis.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court has adopted a comparative analysis, 
wherein it: (1) distills two explanations for the same conduct; (2) treats 
these explanations as mutually exclusive; and (3) determines which 
explanation is likely.  This comparative analysis might make sense when 
evaluating probabilities, but it does not make sense when evaluating 
plausibility.  Thus, the Court should abandon its comparative analysis in 
favor of an analysis that simply asks: Is the plaintiff’s explanation 
plausible?  Does the plaintiff’s explanation seem to be true? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court adopted a new general 
civil pleading standard that is shockingly similar to the probable cause 
standard that pervades criminal law.  Perhaps most disturbing is that, in 
Twombly and Iqbal, the Court adopted a quantum of proof that appears 
to be more-likely-than-not, the same quantum of proof that is typically 
associated with probable cause.  This Comment has attempted to explore 
how the Supreme Court’s probable cause jurisprudence can shed light on 
the new general civil pleading standard.  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court’s probable cause jurisprudence suggests that the new general civil 
pleading standard may not be as subjective as many commentators have 
assumed.  Moreover, the Court may make this standard even more 
objective without abandoning the standard’s core framework.  Still, this 
observation does not mean that the new standard is error-free.  The 
Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217 (2007) (discussing presuit investigatory 
discovery, which is available in some states but is generally unavailable in the federal courts, and 
arguing that such discovery affects litigants’ access to justice because it gives them access to 
information that may be essential to initiating a suit). 
 209. See id. at 273–74 (“[I]f a broader grant of investigatory discovery is given to private 
parties . . . judges should maintain an active oversight role to ensure that the tools are not misused.”). 
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standard seems to require fact-pleading, even though numerous reasons 
militate against such a requirement, and the standard establishes a 
quantum of proof that is all too high. 
These problems may be fixed in a variety of ways.  Congress may 
take action to change the new standard.  Indeed, both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives are considering bills to return civil pleading to 
pre-Conley “notice pleading.”210  Nevertheless, these bills have only just 
been referred to committee, and they have few cosponsors.211  These 
bills may languish in committee for quite some time, and they may 
never even become law. 
In the meantime, the Supreme Court seems unlikely to utterly 
abandon the new general civil pleading standard.  Justices Souter and 
Breyer did move from the Twombly majority to the Iqbal dissent, but 
they ostensibly only disagreed with the way that the majority construed 
Twombly.212  They were not ready to return to the pre-Twombly 
standard.  True, Justice Souter has now been replaced by Justice 
Sotomayor, but even if Justice Sotomayor were inclined to overturn 
Twombly, she would join, at most, two other Justices—Ginsburg and 
Kagan—in taking such a position.  In addition, the Supreme Court has 
arguably lost its sharpest critic of Twombly and Iqbal, Justice Stevens, 
who recently retired. 
Thus, for now, the federal courts are stuck with the new general civil 
pleading standard, and the question is how this standard should be 
interpreted.  This Comment has suggested how the lower courts may 
interpret the standard, and it has suggested how the Supreme Court 
should further refine the standard.  Specifically, the Court should make 
the new standard more objective, and it should allow limited discovery 
based on a showing that is similar to that used for the issuance of a 
search warrant.  Finally, the Court should move from “comparative 
plausibility” to simple or direct plausibility.  These changes should quiet 
critics, increase judicial legitimacy, and keep courtroom doors open. 
 210. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong., available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1504 (last visited Dec. 6, 2010); Open Access to 
Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong., available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=h111-4115 (last visited Dec. 6, 2010). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955, 1960–61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
misapplied Twombly by isolating individual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint); id. at 1961 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (averring that the majority had provided inadequate justification for its interpretation of 
Twombly). 
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